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Abstract:  This paper examines the uneven geography of COVID-19-related excess mortality during 
the first wave of the pandemic in Europe, before assessing the factors behind the geographical 
differences in impact. The analysis of 206 regions across 23 European countries reveals a distinct 
COVID-19 geography. Excess deaths were concentrated in a limited number of regions —expected 
deaths exceeded 20% in just 16 regions— with more than 40% of the regions considered experiencing 
no excess mortality during the first six months of 2020. Highly connected regions, in colder and dryer 
climates, with high air pollution levels, and relatively poorly endowed health systems witnessed the 
highest incidence of excess mortality. Institutional factors also played an important role. The first wave 
hit regions with a combination of weak and declining formal institutional quality and fragile informal 
institutions hardest. Low and declining national government effectiveness, together with a limited 
capacity to reach out across societal divides, and a frequent tendency to meet with friends and family 
were powerful drivers of regional excess mortality.  
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1. Introduction  
In the first half of 2020 most of Europe became ravaged by the deadliest pandemic since the 
1918 Great Flu. Just in the first six months of the year a total of more than 167,000 excess 
deaths relative to the average of the previous five years were computed in the 23 countries 
included in this analysis. The outbreak of the pandemic took the population and governments 
by surprise and, in some cases, led to a collapse or a near collapse of the health system and 
to a raft of containment and mitigation measures —including increased testing, contact 
tracing, lengthy lockdowns, quarantines, and restrictions to mobility— that had an uneven 
impact in the containment of the spread of the virus.  
The pandemic, however, did not strike the whole of Europe in an even way. Some countries 
were hit far harder than others. In the UK, excess mortality during the first six months of 2020 
surpassed 59,000. In Spain it topped 41,000, while in Italy and France the number of excess 
deaths almost reached 36,000 and 21,000, respectively. Relative to the population, the 
highest incidence took place in Belgium, Italy, Spain, and the UK. In contrast, many Central 
and Eastern European countries were spared. Deaths in the Baltic States, Bulgaria, Czechia, 
Hungary, and Slovakia were below the average for the preceding five years. Denmark and 
Germany also had no overall excess mortality during the first half of 2020.  
Differences in excess mortality within countries were often higher than among them. Madrid, 
in Spain, witnessed the highest lethality in percentage terms across all the regions included in 
the analysis. The neighbouring region of Castile-La Mancha came third. At the opposite end, 
two other Spanish regions, Galicia and the Balearic Islands registered no excess deaths in the 
first half of 2020. Lombardy, in Italy, came second in this grim ranking and the pandemic 
impacted other rich Northern Italian regions, such as Trento, Bolzano, the Aosta Valley, or 
Emilia-Romagna. In contrast, seven regions in the central and southern half of the country —
Lazio, Molise, Sicily, Campania, Umbria, Basilicata, and Calabria— registered below average 
mortality levels in that period. Some big cities, such as Paris, London, or Stockholm (on top of 
Madrid and Milan) were also hotspots of the illness. But other large cities remained mostly 
unaffected. Mortality was also below trends in recent years in Norway, most of Finland, most 
of northern Germany, Denmark, Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and in many regions of South 
West France.    
Since it became clear that COVID-19 was no ordinary seasonal flu and that its effects could be 
devastating for, especially, certain groups of the population, scientists and decision-makers 
have scrambled to try to study the factors behind the uneven geography of the COVID-19 
pandemic in Europe. At stake was far more than pure intellectual curiosity. Understanding 
not just the causes of the pandemic but what provoked its differential spread could lead to 
more adequate prevention, detection, and response measures for new waves of COVID-19 
and future epidemics. It would also help prevent situations like the collapse or near collapse 
of health systems that drove European societies to the brink in the months of March and April 
2020. 
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This paper looks at these factors at the subnational level, where, despite some exceptions 
(e.g. Kapitsinis, 2020), the attention has been far scarcer than at national level. The regional 
level possibly represents a more adequate scale to evaluate the dimension and impact of the 
pandemic. Two objectives drive this paper. The first consists of mapping the incidence of the 
first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic —over the period between the 1st of January and the 
30th of June 2020— at a regional level in Europe. Second, it intends to explain what 
determines the uneven geography of the excess mortality detected in European regions over 
that period.  
The reason for choosing excess mortality rather than other factors, such as number of cases 
or number of deaths officially attributed to COVID-19 is related —as will be discussed in 
greater length in the methodological section— to the greater reliability and comparability of 
excess mortality data in a year in which no other epidemics have been reported.  
The analysis will focus on the factors that have been highlighted by the rapidly mounting 
literature on the drivers of COVID-19: from levels of agglomeration, regional wealth, density, 
local accessibility and connectivity to age structure, education, readiness of health systems, 
air pollution, and climate. Particular emphasis will be put on a dimension that, so far, has 
attracted less attention: the role of formal and informal institutions in explaining the uneven 
geography of the pandemic. Factors such as national and regional government quality and 
their change over time will be conflated with levels of regional autonomy and with more 
informal institutions, such as the frequency of personal interactions, the degree of trust, and 
the capacity of different groups within a society to build bridges with one another to assess 
what role they have played, if at all, in determining why some regions of Europe were 
devastated by the virus, while others relatively spared.  
To achieve these objectives the paper adopts the following structure. A presentation of the 
uneven geography of the incidence of COVID-19 across regions of Europe follows this 
introduction.  The factors that have been identified as drivers of the variations in the incidence 
of the pandemic are analysed in section three. This is followed by the introduction of the data 
and the methodology, before going over the results of the econometric analysis. The final 
section concludes and presents some preliminary policy implications. 
 
2. The uneven geography of the first wave of COVID-19  
 
2.1. Mapping excess mortality 
History has taught us that the geography of pandemics is often unpredictable. The 14th 
century Black Death is estimated to have taken the lives of about 75 million people 
(Benedictow, 2004). It affected between one and two thirds of the European population at 
the time (Benedictow, 2004; Ziegler, 2013). But its impact was highly territorially uneven. 
Certain cities in Europe were exposed to a far greater degree than others. The Black Death 
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ravaged the cities of eastern Sicily, especially Catania, Syracuse or Scicli, but it had a far lower 
incidence in neighbouring Palermo and Naples. Similarly, it wiped out most of the population 
of Ciudad Real, but nearby Toledo fared much better (Christakos et al., 2005).    
The European geography of COVID-19, while fortunately far less lethal than that of the Black 
Death, is equally capricious. During the first wave of the pandemic some European countries 
were far more affected both in terms of cases and COVID-19 related mortality than others. 
The United Kingdom, Spain, Belgium, and Italy saw the greatest incidence. Countries like the 
Netherlands, Sweden, or France followed at some distance. By contrast, Norway, Iceland, 
Germany, Czechia, Slovakia, Hungary, or Bulgaria had a less lethal first wave.  
Within country contrasts often matched, if not exceeded, cross-country variation. Figure 1 
shows the map of excess mortality —as a percentage of deaths relative to expected deaths 
based on mortality in the previous five years—of the first wave of the pandemic across 
European regions. The pronounced differences in excess mortality over the first 27 weeks of 
2020 are striking. Excess mortality exceeded expectations by more than 40% in the regions of 
Madrid, Lombardy, and Castile-La Mancha. The excess was over 20% in 16 of the 206 
European regions considered in the analysis and over 10% in 41. By contrast, in 85 of the 206 
regions for which data are available, no excess mortality was recorded. In more than 41% of 
the regions the number of deaths in early 2020 was below the average of the previous five 
years, amid the worst pandemic to have hit Europe in a century.  
The key hotspots of infection and mortality were often large cities: Madrid and Milan, but 
also London, Paris, Brussels, and Stockholm (Figure 1). Even in countries with a lower 
incidence of COVID-19, the impact of the pandemic was more severe in some of the largest 
agglomerations, such as Helsinki, Budapest, Sofia, or Bremen, Hamburg, and Berlin. But this 
was not always the case. In Italy, two of the three largest cities —Rome and Naples— had 
excess mortality below the national average. The same could be said of Prague, Oslo, or of 
the largest urban agglomeration in Germany, the Ruhr Valley in North Rhine-Westphalia. 
Finally, contrasts within countries were marked. In addition to the already mentioned 
contrasts within Italy and Spain, there was also a manifest North East/South East division in 
France and a South/North one in Germany. In the Netherlands, the pandemic affected the 
South and East to a greater extent than the more densely populated western provinces of 
Holland. In Poland, the division was more East/West with a lower incidence in the less 
developed regions of the East of the country (Figure 1).    
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Figure 1. Excess death rates (as a percentage deviation from expected deaths, based on the 
previous 5 years) by region in the first six months of 2020.  
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
Changing the reference from the excess percentage of expected mortality to excess mortality 
by population yields a similar map (Figure 2). Excess mortality remains concentrated in a 
limited number of countries, mostly in large, dense, and highly connected cities, but this is 
not the case everywhere and strong internal within-country contrasts remain.  
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Figure 2.  Excess death rates (per 100,000 inhabitants) by region in the first six months of 
2020.           
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
2.2. Change over time 
Excess mortality linked to the COVID-19 pandemic was also not evenly spread across the first 
half of the year. In those areas with the greatest excess deaths, it was time-confined to a 
limited number of weeks, depending on when the largest outbreak of the epidemic happened 
in each place. Figure 3 displays the weekly evolution of excess mortality over the first six 
months of 2020 in the six hardest hit regions in Europe —Madrid, Lombardy, Castile-La 
Mancha, London, Catalonia, and Stockholm, in that order— by percentage of excess 
mortality.  
In all cases the bulk of excess deaths took place in a few weeks during the months of March 
and April. In Madrid excess mortality was in line with trends in the previous five years 
between weeks 0 and 9 and from week 20 onwards. The concentration of fatalities happened 
7 
 
fundamentally between weeks 12 and 15, when the excess mortality multiplied expectations 
by almost five times. In Lombardy mortality was below previous years in the first seven weeks 
and rose steeply since then, with the biggest incidence taking place between weeks 11 and 
15 (Figure 3).    
In Castile-La Mancha and Catalonia the time patterns were like those found in Madrid, albeit 
delayed by one week. Overall excess mortality was also lower in Catalonia. The lethality of 
the outbreak in London started later —mortality only increased in late March. However, the 
impact was more protracted in time, covering the whole of April and, with lower intensity, 
parts of May. In Stockholm, excess mortality also happened later (with a peak around week 
15) and was extended into May and June (Figure 3). 
In contrast, in many other regions of Europe the incidence and lethality of COVID-19 was far 
lower. In some regions, such as North Holland, excess mortality was also concentrated around 
week 15 of the year, but more subdued than in other regions with a similar population size 
and density (Figure 4). Copenhagen and Campania were also relatively spared, in spite of their 
large populations and high densities. And excess mortality was non-existent in most of Central 
and Eastern European countries. In Lesser Poland (the region of Cracow) and the South East 
of Bulgaria (hosting Sofia) mortality rates throughout the period were roughly those of a 
normal year. In Northern Hungary —the region with the lowest mortality rate of those 
included in the analysis— mortality was below that of the previous five years in virtually every 
week of the first half of 2020 (Figure 4). Excess mortality for every European region included 
in the analysis during the first wave of the pandemic is presented in Appendix A.     
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3. What factors explain this uneven geography?  
 
3.1. Size, accessibility, ageing, environment, and preparation 
What explains this uneven regional geography of COVID-19-related excess mortality? Many 
different drivers of the expansion of the pandemic has been put forward. First and foremost, 
the spread of the pandemic has been linked with the presence of large agglomerations of 
people and greater connectivity (Coelho et al., 2020). The fact that large and highly connected 
cities were among the first to be affected put the focus on issues like agglomeration, density, 
and connectivity. Large and open cities, such as London, Paris, Madrid, or Milan have been 
regarded as favourable environments for the arrival and diffusion of the disease. Large 
airports provided the entry points (Daon et al., 2020). The sheer concentration of people in 
high density environments did the rest. Large, dense, rich, and accessible European cities have 
therefore been regarded as a hotbed for the spread of coronavirus. But the role of these 
factors —and, especially, density— for the expansion and incidence of the disease has been 
challenged (e.g. Florida and Mellander, 2020; Hamidi et al., 2020; Nathan, 2020). Density may 
have influenced the timing of early outbreaks but have less of an influence in COVID-19-
related mortality over time (Carozzi et al., 2020). Empirical evidence shows that not every 
large European city fared in the same way as London, Paris, or Madrid. Regions hosting other 
large cities, like Rome, Oslo, Prague, or Budapest, experienced no excess mortality in the first 
half of 2020. That was also the case for regions with some large international airports. Hessen 
in Germany and Zurich in Switzerland had the 4th and 15th largest airports in Europe by 
passenger traffic in 2019, respectively. Yet the incidence of the pandemic in both regions was 
far lower than in other airport hubs. And the largest region by population in Europe, North 
Rhine-Westphalia, with close to 18 million inhabitants and a high population density, also 
witnessed no excess mortality in the first six months of 2020.  
Ageing, and differences in ageing trends across Europe, have also been signalled as a factor 
for excess mortality (e.g. Kashnitsky and Aburto, 2020). The pandemic has fundamentally 
targeted the elderly. Excess mortality has been particularly high among those over 65 and, in 
particular, those over 75. An ageing population in Northern Italy or, indeed, in regions of 
Northern France and Spain could be behind the particularly strong impact of the first wave of 
COVID-19 in these areas. However, other areas of Europe with a severe ageing challenges, 
such as Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, or the Nordic countries were, by and large, not as severely 
hit as Northern Italy, Madrid, Paris, or London.    
Differences in levels of education are also expected to have played a role in the diffusion of 
the pandemic. A more educated population is more capable to shield itself from the most 
devastating effects of COVID-19 for several reasons. First, those with a higher level of 
education generally display a greater knowledge and awareness of the pandemic and of the 
measures needed to prevent infection (Zhong et al. 2020). Second, a higher average level of 
education in the population facilitates the possibility of conducting work from home, as well 
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as the capacity of to protect the children through remote learning and to prevent unnecessary 
outings and cover unforeseen expenditures (Blundell et al, 2020: 293).   
The potential role of environmental factors, ranging from climate conditions to air quality and 
pollution, has also been extensively discussed. The incidence of COVID-19-related cases has 
been connected with lower temperatures (Bashir et al., 2020; Gomes da Silva et al., 2020; 
Sajadi et al., 2020; Wang et al., 2020) and with lower (Sajadi et al., 2020; Wang et al., 2020) 
—and, in some cases, higher (Gomes da Silva et al., 2020)— humidity levels and precipitation. 
Air quality has attracted even more attention. Low air quality (Bashir et al., 2020; Filippini et 
al, 2020) and, in particular, the presence of high concentrations of inhalable particulate 
matter (PM 2.5) (Zoran et al., 2020) have been considered to assist the spread of cases and, 
consequently, to lead to higher COVID-19-related mortality (Copat et al., 2020). The presence 
of pollutants in the air can enable the capacity of COVID-19 and other respiratory viruses to 
spread easily in the population and to affect their lethality (Domingo et al., 2020).  
Many European regions with poor air quality, both in terms of PM 2.5 and of carbon 
emissions, such as Lombardy, Piedmont, Veneto in Italy or Alsace in France, have had a high 
incidence of the virus. But this is far from the case everywhere. The worst levels of PM 2.5 in 
Europe are found in Central and Eastern Europe (OECD, 2020), above all in the regions of 
Silesia, Lesser Poland, Moravia-Silesia, Central Moravia, and Central Slovakia. Yet the COVID-
19 related excess mortality during the first wave of the pandemic in these regions was limited.        
The readiness of different health systems to withstand unusual or irregular events, such as 
the current pandemic, has also been scrutinised. The capacity to prevent and detect 
outbreaks early and to respond to them has been associated to a raft of different conditions 
within national and local health systems, among which the staffing of health personnel and 
the availability of hospital beds rank high (Liang et al., 2020; Kandel et al., 2020). Insufficiently 
staffed and prepared health systems have been deemed slow to detect and respond to 
outbreaks, leading to a greater exposure of doctors, nurses, and other health workers to the 
virus (Ahmed et al., 2020), greater infection rates, and greater COVID-19-related mortality 
(Liang et al., 2020).  
3.2. Formal and informal institutions 
The impact of the pandemic may, however, also have been influenced by the deep 
institutional variations across the European continent. Institutions —or the rules of the game 
that shape human interaction and structure incentives for political, social, and economic 
exchange (North, 1990)— and their quality vary considerably across Europe. This happens 
both in terms of the more formal institutions, such as the rules, laws, and forms of 
organisation in a society, and of informal institutions, or the individual habits, collective 
routines, and social norms that determine the types and frequency of interaction (Amin, 
1999). 
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There is considerable variation across Europe in formal institutional arrangements. In many 
countries of Europe government decisions are fundamentally taken in national capitals, with 
limited discretion to make and implement decisions at the local level. In others the authority 
of subnational tiers of government is far greater. Differences in regional authority are stark 
between, on the one hand, highly centralised countries, such as Ireland, Portugal, Finland, 
Denmark, or Poland, and, on the other, highly decentralised countries, such as Germany, 
Spain, or Belgium (Hooghe et al., 2016). Such differences are crucial in a pandemic whose 
incidence, as we have seen, differs greatly not only across countries, but also across regions 
within countries. These asymmetries in the incidence of the pandemic imply that local 
measures to tackle COVID-19 can be as, if not more, effective than national ones. It is often 
assumed that empowered subnational governments can respond faster and in a more and 
better targeted way than more remote national ones (Rodríguez-Pose et al., 2009), provided 
they have the adequate capacity and efficiency to rise to the challenge. However, in the case 
of Europe, differences in quality of government are marked, with subnational governments 
in Northern Europe being distinctly of a better quality than in regions in the South Eastern 
corner of the continent (Charron et al., 2014). Despite the fact that variations in government 
quality are persistent over time, changes in subnational government efficiency have taken 
place, with noticeable improvements over the last decade in countries like the Baltics or 
Slovakia and a deterioration, at least in relative terms, in Italy, Spain, and, to a lesser extent, 
France (Rodríguez-Pose and Ketterer, 2020).   
In any case, regional and local governments, especially in exceptional times, must operate 
within national legislative frameworks and, regardless of the level of decentralisation, follow 
national policies, guidelines, and regulations. This implies a constant level of coordination 
during a pandemic that has tested the shared ruled capacity of national and subnational 
governments to find coordinated solutions (Marks et al., 2008). National governments have 
also taken the lead in adopting most of the tough decisions, especially during the first wave 
of the pandemic. They have been mostly responsible for the introduction and policing of often 
lengthy lockdowns and quarantines, the closure of public spaces, workplaces and educational 
institutions, restrictions to mobility, or the implementation of mandatory health rules, among 
others. The capacity and/or willingness of governments to, first, adopt tough decisions, and 
then efficiently design, coordinate, implement, and monitor them has been, however, highly 
variable. In some cases, European national governments have adopted highly stringent 
measures. According to the Oxford Coronavirus Government Response Tracker (Hale et al., 
2020), the most stringent measures in Europe as of 1 April 2020 were in place in Serbia (not 
in the analysis), Croatia, Cyprus, and Italy. In contrast, Sweden and, especially, Belarus (not in 
the analysis) had notoriously lax COVID-19 related restrictions. 
But even more important than the stringency of the measures adopted has been the capacity 
of different governments to effectively implement such measures. This is greatly related to 
variations in national government effectiveness and its change over time. More effective 
governments are far more capable to respond rapidly to challenges and to adopt incisive 
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measures more effectively, independently of political pressures (Kaufmann and Kraay, 2020). 
The level of change in government efficiency also affects the impact of the delivery of policies. 
Prolonged declines in government and civil service efficiency and creeping political pressures 
over decision-making may have compromised the capacity and credibility of governments to 
commit to what are difficult to implement policies, highly restrictive of personal freedoms. 
Long periods of ebbing government quality may have reduced the capacity of governments 
to respond to deep shocks, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, leading to difficulties in raising 
up to the challenge and in garnering the much-needed political consensus in times of 
emergency.   
While the adoption of measures to combat the pandemic fundamentally rests on formal 
institutions, local and regional informal institutions also play a crucial role in their success. 
How populations engage with one another and how frequently individuals see each other 
may facilitate or hinder the spread of the virus.  As Richard Florida (2020) highlights, rather 
than density, what matters is the kind of density. In this respect crowdedness and frequent 
interactions within friend- and family-circles are possibly more likely to have helped the 
spread of the virus.  
Different forms of social capital, such as trust and the capacity to build consensus, are other 
informal institutions that may have determined variations in COVID-19 incidence (e.g. Elgar 
et al., 2020). However stringent government measures to prevent and limit the spread of the 
virus may have been, their effectiveness may have come to nothing in environments with 
limited generalised trust and trust in government capacity and in health-related information. 
And the ability to build bridges across groups facilitates interaction and the generation of 
consensus. Bridging social capital is at the heart of civic engagement (Putnam, 1993), which 
is of crucial importance for the acceptance by the population of the tough responses needed 
during a pandemic.  
However, all these institutional factors have featured far less prominently than 
agglomeration, density, ageing, health readiness, climate, or pollution in COVID-19-related 
research. Yet the slow reaction to the pandemic in countries with a high excess mortality 
during the first wave of the pandemic —like the UK, Spain, Belgium, and Italy— could have 
been related to declines in government efficiency in recent decades. Similarly, a greater habit 
of regularly meeting family and friends in celebrations could have been a factor driving up 
mortality in Mediterranean countries relative to the Nordics. 
 
4. Data and method 
To test the variations in the link between different potential drivers —including institutions 
and other regional characteristics— and COVID-19-related excess mortality during the first 
wave of the pandemic, we rely on data stemming from several databases: EUROSTAT, the 
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European Social Survey (ESS), the Quality of Government Institute, the Regional Authority 
Index (RAI), and the OECD. 
 
4.1. The dependent variable 
The dependent variable is excess mortality rates at a regional level in Europe during the first 
six months of 2020. The choice of excess mortality as the indicator of the incidence of the 
COVID-19 pandemic in Europe is related to its far greater reliability in comparison to potential 
alternatives, such as the number or share of COVID-19 cases or the official toll of COVID-19 
certified deaths. As indicated by numerous commentators (e.g. Burns-Murdoch, 2020), the 
reporting of cases and fatalities during the COVID-19 pandemic has been besieged with 
problems and inaccuracies. Factors such as variations in the capacity to test at different times 
during the pandemic and differences and changes in the definition of what is a COVID-19-
induced death, mean that doubts have been cast on the reliability of the reporting of new 
cases and of COVID-19 deaths. In certain countries, COVID-19 reporting may also have been 
massaged and subject to political vagaries, increasing its unreliability (Burns-Murdoch, 2020). 
In contrast, countries in Europe have been far better at counting deaths —a statistic they have 
been accurately collecting for decades— and the system has become far more sophisticated 
through the introduction of regular mortality monitoring (MOMO), both within countries and 
at the European level.  
Excess mortality is thus increasingly regarded as the more adequate indicator to measure the 
overall incidence of COVID-19 (Vanella et al., 2020). In general, studies that use excess 
mortality tend to report higher levels of lethality than simply relying on COVID-19 officially 
attributed deaths, which, on the whole, underestimate the true incidence of COVID-19 (Felix-
Cardoso et al., 2020).    
We acknowledge that not all excess deaths in the first half of 2020 will be the result of COVID-
19. On the one hand, the fear of going to a hospital during an epidemic and the stress on the 
health system in many parts of Europe may have led to excess mortality as a consequence of 
the lack of immediate and/or early treatment of certain illnesses unrelated to COVID-19. 
These additional deaths may, however, be considered as indirect effects of COVID-19. On the 
other, extensive lockdowns, quarantines, and the fear of going out during a pandemic are 
likely to have reduced other types of mortality, such as deaths provoked by road accidents or 
by exposure to contagious diseases. This may explain in part why in some regions of Europe 
and even in those with the greatest lethality of COVID-19, excess mortality in early 2020 has 
been during some periods —especially in the second half of May and in June— lower than in 
previous years.         
Data on excess mortality rates are extracted from EUROSTAT. EUROSTAT gathers these data 
from COVID-19 reporting by national statistical institutes or equivalent. The data on the 
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number of weekly deaths per region are available for a total of 23 European countries.1 These 
data are gathered at NUTS 1 level for Belgium, Germany, and the UK, and at NUTS 2 level for 
all other regions.  
There are various mechanisms to calculate excess mortality. In our analysis we adopt the 
more common one: calculating the deviation from expected deaths in a given place in the first 
27 weeks of 2020. As is commonly done, we calculate this as the ratio between the number 
of deaths per week in the first sixth months of 2020 (from the 1st of January until the 30th of 
June) and the average deaths for the same weeks in the period 2015-2019. We do this both 
as a percentage change as well as relative to the population (per 100,000 inhabitants) in a 
region. 
 
4.2. Independent variables 
The independent variables include population in 2019 and GDP in 2018 as a proxy for regional 
agglomeration (Combes et al., 2011), GDP per capita in 2018 to control for regional wealth, 
and population per squared kilometre in 2018 denoting density.  
Connectivity is measured using accessibility by air and road. Accessibility by air is represented 
by the number of air passengers arriving in a region in 2018. Accessibility by road is calculated 
for 2014. The index includes a rather steep exponential function making accessibility 
negligible beyond four hours of travel.  
The demographic characteristics of each region’s inhabitants are measured by the median 
age of the population in 2019 and the share of population over 65 and over 75 in 2019. 
Education is calculated using the share of higher education graduates among adult population 
(aged 25 and over).  
One of the main effects during the peak of the first wave of COVID-19 has been the saturation 
of hospitals and intensive care units. We control for the capacity of regional health care 
systems using two variables: the number of doctors per capita in 2017 and the number of 
hospital beds in that same year.  
Environmental conditions are proxied with several measures for air pollution and climate. We 
introduce the exposure to air pollution by particulate matter (PM 2.5) at regional level in 2016 
(using OECD data), as well as the total household carbon footprint (kgCO2e/cap), and the 
average household carbon footprint both at regional level in 2010 (Ivanova et al., 2017). We 
also resort to the average of temperatures in 2019 and the average precipitation in 2019, 
provided by the Agri-4-Cast EU-JRC database, to control for climate.   
 
1 These are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
and the UK. 
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Our main variables of interest, local institutions, are divided in the analysis into three macro 
blocks:  level of autonomy, government quality, and social capital and trust. 
Regional autonomy is proxied by the Regional Authority Index (RAI), provided by Hooghe et 
al. (2016). This index compiles ten different dimensions, involving institutional depth, policy 
scope, fiscal autonomy, borrowing autonomy, and so forth. The RAI represents a composite 
measure of the relevance of subnational governments in the overall national decision process. 
Formal institutions are measured through the indicator of government quality in 2017 at a 
regional level  (Charron et al., 2016, 2019) and government effectiveness in 2018 at national 
level (Kaufmann and Kraay, 2020). The regional quality of government index is a composite 
indicator that takes into consideration not only the perception of the quality of public 
services, but also the level of corruption, and the impartiality of institutions. National 
government effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the civil 
service and the degree of its independence from political pressure (Kaufmann and Kraay, 
2020). For the reasons presented in the theoretical section, we introduce these variables in 
levels and as changes for the longest period available —between 2010 and 2017 at regional 
level and 1998 and 2018 at country level— as, as indicated by Kaufmann and Kraay (2020), 
changes in governance quality are typically small over short time horizons and should only be 
considered over longer periods.  
Finally, we control for informal interactions by means of levels of sociability, regional trust, 
and social capital indices. These three indicators are computed using 2016 European Social 
Survey (ESS) data, a survey directed by the University of London within the European Research 
Infrastructure Consortium Forum. The primary aim of the ESS is to collect information at the 
individual level on personal and social well-being, social capital and social trust, social 
exclusion, education and occupation, among other themes. This survey is conducted every 
two years and targets persons older than 15 years. Our measure of sociability and interaction 
is computed as the share of population in each region interacting at least once week a week 
with members of his/her family or with friends. Generalised trust is used as our indicator of 
trust in the system. Social capital is proxied, following Putnam (1993, 2000), by what is known 
as bridging social capital. This is measured by the participation of individuals in a given region 
in voluntary associations aimed at forging connections among people from different cultural, 
social, economic, and other type of backgrounds.  
The name, description, and source of each variable is reported in Appendix B, Table B1, while 
summary statistics appear in Table B2 in the same Appendix. 
 
4.3. Method 
The analysis is conducted by means of a set of OLS regressions, introducing each regional (or 
national) characteristic alone, first, with the final model including all explanatory variables 
together. 
17 
 
The equation behind the full model adopts the following form:  
  
 
where i are the European regions. To mitigate for error correlation within regions, standard 
errors are clustered at regional level. We also compute the variance inflation factor test (VIF) 
to control for potential multicollinearity among regressors (Miles, 2014). All regressions are 
run with country fixed effects, except for those that include national level government 
effectiveness variables, that de facto act as a country fixed effect. 
Because not all data are available for all regions included in the analysis, the number of 
regions covered varies depending on the regression. The maximum is 206 regions, the 
minimum is limited to 122, when the number of doctors per capita is included with all the 
other controls. Regardless of the number of regions in each regression, the results tend to be 
consistent.  
 
5. Analysis of results 
 
5.1. Regressions considering individual factors 
We first consider each group of individual factors. Table 1 assesses the link between 
agglomeration, regional wealth, density, and accessibility and connectivity, on the one hand, 
and excess mortality at a regional level during the first six months of 2020, on the other.  
The results indicate that excess mortality during that period was related to regional wealth, 
to having a larger economy, greater population density, and being more accessible and 
connected. However, the link between connectivity and excess mortality is stronger when 
accessibility by road is taken into account, rather than accessibility by air (Table 1).  Regions 
more accessible within a four-hour road trip witnessed a higher excess mortality than air 
passenger hubs. By contrast, the variable for population size in a region displays a non-
significant coefficient (Table 1, Regression 1). 
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These results go mostly in line with expectations. Economically large, dense, and rich regions 
have been considered breeding grounds for the spread of COVID-19. So have more connected 
and accessible regions, although here the expectation was that air transport would have been 
as relevant a determinant of the incidence of the virus as road accessibility. After all, airports 
have been under the spotlight as diffusers of COVID-19 (Daon et al., 2020). The rapid decline 
in air transport during the first half of 2020 may have dented their association with COVID-19 
mortality. Road accessibility proved a more durable and lethal factor over time. Hence, as 
hinted by Florida et al. (2020), there may be a difference in the incidence of different types of 
connectivity between the geography of the first-hit places and the final geography of COVID-
19 excess mortality, at least during this first wave of the pandemic. 
The age structure of the population, its level of education, the preparation of the health 
system, and climate and air pollution as potential drivers of excess mortality are assessed in 
Table 2. Here, the more environmental factors go along with expectations and with most of 
the literature. The lethality attributed to COVID-19 is greater in colder places and in regions 
with a higher degree of air pollution —although this seems to be only connected with the 
average household carbon footprint in a region. The coefficients for PM 2.5 and for the total 
household carbon footprint are positive and close to being significant (Table 2).  
However, most of the other factors considered in these fields are irrelevant of go against 
expectations. The coefficients for doctors and hospital beds per capita are insignificant, as is 
the coefficient for the share of the population over the age of 75. The two other indications 
of ageing societies —the share of the population over 65 and the median age of the 
population— have negative coefficients, significant at the 10% level. This is unexpected for 
an illness that has mostly targeted elderly people. Areas with a more educated population 
have also witnessed a greater number of excess deaths (Table 2), meaning that other factors 
may play a more relevant role in COVID-19-related mortality. 
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The institutional factors considered also seem to matter. Regions with a greater level of 
autonomy performed better than those subject to a more centralised regime (Table 3). So 
have regions in countries that have seen a long-term improvement in their government 
quality and those with a greater bridging social capital, that is those where a greater share of 
the population is involved in activities with people of a different condition. Higher regional 
government quality was connected to a higher number of deaths, although the introduction 
of this variable suffers from multicollinearity, as revealed by the high VIF scores when it is 
included in the analysis (Table 3). The coefficients for the other indicators, including national 
government effectiveness, the change in regional government quality, the frequency of 
interactions, and the levels of trust are, all insignificant. 
What happens when the independent variables are all considered together? (Table 4). Do 
certain factors matter more than others? Are institutional factors more connected to excess 
mortality in the first half of 2020 than some other factors, such as agglomeration, connectivity 
or age structure? Table 4 reports the results of conducting this analysis. When all the factors 
considered are included together, excess mortality in the first half of 2020 happened 
fundamentally in wealthier regions that are more accessible by road. Once again accessibility 
by road trumped accessibility by air in its connection with excess mortality.  
Areas of Europe with a higher level of education and located in cooler and dryer environments 
also experienced a higher excess death toll (Table 4), as pointed out by previous research (e.g. 
Sajadi et al., 2020; Wang et al., 2020). The coefficients for pollution also go along with most 
of previous research (Bashir et al., 2020; Copat et al., 2020; Domingo et al. 2020; Filippini et 
al, 2020). Regions with a greater overall and with a higher than average household carbon 
footprints were hit harder by the first wave of the pandemic (Table 4, Regressions 4 and 5). 
So was the case of areas with a weaker degree of preparation of health systems. The 
coefficients for the number of doctors and hospital beds per capita —which were insignificant 
when both factors were considered in isolation (Table 3)— become negative and significant 
when analysed in combination with other potential drivers of the deadliness of the pandemic 
(Table 3, Regressions 7 and 8). This is in line with the mounting amount of research pointing 
to the quality and preparedness of local health systems as a fundamental factor in lessening 
the impact of the pandemic (Ahmed et al., 2020; Liang et al., 2020; Kandel et al., 2020).  
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In contrast, most agglomeration factors appear as irrelevant for excess mortality. This is the 
case of the size of the population of the region and of its density. The size of the population 
displays an insignificant coefficient in every regression, whereas density, in line with the work 
of Carozzi et al. (2020), is either insignificant or marginally negative. This result contrasts with 
that of the degree of sociability of the population of a region. Regions where its citizens tend 
to meet more frequently with friends and family suffered more during the pandemic than 
densely populated regions. As Florida (2020) indicates, the impact of COVID-19 may be 
unrelated to density and far more to how people interact. Excess mortality seems to have 
been more about habits of engaging with others and, perhaps, with crowdedness. Density 
counts for little if people do not meet and hug each other, if they avoid long and frequent 
interactions with friends and family, which have been an important source of many COVID-
19 outbreaks. 
The remaining results emphasise the importance of our main variables of interest, formal and 
informal institutions, in the diffusion and impact of COVID-19 across the regions of Europe. 
On the more informal side, it is not just that different modes and traditions of social 
engagement contribute to the lethality of the pandemic, but that a greater capacity in the 
population to engage with people from different origins and conditions seems to have acted 
as a barrier to the lethality of the virus. The coefficients for bridging social network are always 
negative and mostly highly significant (Table 4). Variations in the levels of trust, by contrast, 
seem to have played a more limited role in the differences in excess mortality observed across 
regions in the first half of 2020 (see also Elgar et al., 2020). 
Formal institutions also matter. The model is run without the degree of regional government 
quality, as the introduction of that variable was associated with multicollinearity. The results 
indicate that, in the case of fighting the pandemic, government effectiveness at the national 
level mattered more than that at regional level. Countries with a better government 
effectiveness and those that had a greater improvement over time in their government 
effectiveness are far more likely to have had lower levels of excess mortality in the first six 
months of 2020. Regions with a greater level of autonomy also fared far better and, although  
the coefficient for the change in regional government quality is always positive and at times 
significant, it appears that national government effectiveness was far more important than 
regional government effectiveness in taming the virus, at least during the first wave (Table 4). 
The ageing variable is always insignificant when included with other controls, whereas the 
levels of education in a region tend to be positively connected to higher excess mortality. 
These general considerations are reinforced by analysing the connection between individual 
variables and excess mortality in the first six months of 202 in our base regression: Table 4, 
Regressions 3. This regression includes all the variables of agglomeration, density, 
accessibility, ageing, education, environmental conditions, and the formal and informal 
institutions. The strongest association with the excess mortality as a percentage of expected 
deaths is related to the two national government effectiveness variables. A one standard 
deviation increase in government effectiveness in 2018 or in improvements in government 
effectiveness between 1998 and 2018 was connected to a reduction in excess mortality 
during the first half of 2020 of 0.44 standard deviations in both cases (Table 4, Regression 3). 
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Greater road accessibility had the same effect, albeit with a positive sign. In places more 
accessible by road, a one standard deviation rise in accessibility increased excess mortality by 
0.44 standard deviations. Other relationships that stand out are linked to regional wealth (a 
0.38 standard deviation increase in excess mortality), regional autonomy (0.30 reduction) and 
sociability, proxied by the frequency of meeting with friends and family (0.28 reduction) 
(Table 4, Regression 3). 
Changing the dependent variable from excess mortality as a percentage of expected deaths 
to a share of the population —which we do as a robustness test in Tables C1 to C4 in Appendix 
C— yields, in general, marginally higher explanatory capacities (as indicated by the higher R2 
in the regressions), but hardly changes the significance and association of the different 
variables to excess mortality during the first half of 2020. This is particularly the case for the 
full model (Table C4). 
 
6. Conclusions 
Since the arrival of the COVID-19 pandemic to Europe there has been no shortage of research 
looking into why it spread as fast as it did and why it affected some people and places far 
more than others. Most of the research has tended to point to large, dense, highly connected, 
and polluted cities in countries with weak or weakened health systems as the main hotspots 
for the entry and the diffusion of the virus.  
However, the analysis at subnational level has been far less prominent and the salience of 
other factors and, in particular, of the institutional dimension in the spread of COVID-19 has 
attracted far less attention. 
In this paper we have aimed to address these shortcomings by examining the uneven regional 
geography of COVID-19 excess mortality in Europe and connecting it to the distinct variations 
in formal and informal institutions in evidence across the continent. 
The analysis has revealed both the large cross- and within-country inequality in the impact of 
the virus. During the first six months of the year, excess mortality exceeded expectations by 
more than 40% in only three regions. 16 regions had excess mortality over 20% and 41 over 
10%. This latter number represented half of the regions that witnessed mortality rates that 
were below those expected based on average mortality during the same period in the 
previous five years. Preventive measures and lockdowns may have led to a reduction of other 
types of mortality (e.g. road accidents, non-COVID-19-related infections diseases) and help 
explain this below average mortality in many parts of Central and Eastern Europe, but also in 
Northern Germany, South East France and in the Nordic countries, outside Sweden. 
The drivers of this uneven geography are, according to our research, very much in line with 
what has been reported by previous research. The most affected regions of Europe have been 
relatively large and connected regions, in colder and dryer climates, with high air pollution 
levels and relatively poorly endowed health systems. Most agglomeration factors and, in 
particular, population density have been relatively marginal to the impact of the disease, 
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while excess mortality seems much more related to advantages in accessibility by road rather 
than by air.   
While these results add interesting nuance to existing knowledge, the biggest novelty lies in 
how institutional factors have shaped the impact of the virus. The most ravaged regions of 
Europe by COVID-19 were those with a combination of weak and declining formal institutional 
quality and brittle informal institutions. Low and declining government effectiveness at the 
national level —much more than at the regional one— emerges as one of the key factors 
behind excess mortality in the first half of 2020. Regions in countries with weak and declining 
government effectiveness were less capable to adopt, implement, and monitor the often-
tough decisions that have been proven to have be more effective in the fight against the 
pandemic. Citizens in these countries consequently endured the lower capacity of their 
governments to prepare and rapidly respond to the challenges of COVID-19 and to garner the 
necessary political consensus to take tough decisions. Weak and weakening national 
government effectiveness also restricted their capacity to react early to what was taking place 
elsewhere and to learn from the successes and mistakes of measures adopted in other places. 
Weaker and weakening government and bureaucratic efficiency may have also led to 
frequent changes of direction in the adoption and implementation of policies and may have 
been at the source of chronic failures in protecting key health and other types of essential 
workers from infection. They may have produced an inability to coordinate public 
intervention effectively in all types of measures, including in areas such as the procurement 
of medical and protective equipment for key workers. A better local performance in those 
regions with more regional autonomy did not compensate for the failures in national 
government effectiveness. 
Informal institutions also played their part in the striking differences in excess mortality. 
COVID-19-related excess mortality was far higher in regions where people meet more often, 
but where the capacity to build bridges across different groups to create consensus is weak.  
Weak government effectiveness, weak consensus building capacity, and frequent within 
group meetings have led to a fragile response to the COVID-19 pandemic. These conditions 
limited the capacity to find consensual solutions understood, respected, and followed by the 
population. Hence “every man/woman for himself/herself” type of strategies often prevailed 
in these regions. Even in the case of widely accepted measures, their implementation over 
time may have left a lot to be desired, relative to other areas of Europe. Overall, this type of 
regions struggled to put in place effective and co-ordinated responses when the virus struck 
and failed to instil the necessary trust to bring the population on board over the long periods 
required to combat the pandemic. Unfortunately, this possibly resulted in higher death rates 
linked to the pandemic. 
Confronting the challenges of COVID-19 and future health or natural shocks requires 
effectively tackling institutional bottlenecks. While little can be done in terms of addressing 
agglomeration and density and climate is an exogenous factor, improving national 
government effectiveness and redressing government quality decline should be priorities to 
respond to this pandemic and to prepare societies for future social, economic, and political 
challenges. Addressing profound social cleavages and finding the mechanisms to reach 
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greater consensus across divides is also essential. Any delays or failure to improve in this 
respect have, as we have seen during the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic, an important 
cost in lives.  
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APPENDIX B 
Table B1. Variable description 
Macro-Area Variable Year Description Level Source 
Agglomeration 
Population 2019 Number of inhabitants  NUTS2 EUROSTAT 
GDP 2018 Gross Domestic Product  NUTS2 EUROSTAT 
Regional Wealth GDP per capita 2018 Share of GDP per 
100,000 inhabitants  
NUTS2 EUROSTAT 
Density 
Population 
density 2018 Population per km
2 NUTS2 EUROSTAT 
Accessibility and 
connectivity 
Air passengers 2018 Air transport of passengers NUTS2 EUROSTAT 
Accessibility by 
road 2014 
Road accessibility 
measured as the 
inverse time-distance 
weighted population 
NUTS2 
Raw data 
gathered by Klaus 
Spiekermann 
EU Commission 
Age structure 
Median 
population age 
2019 Median age of the 
population  
NUTS2 EUROSTAT 
Share of 
population over 
65 
2019 
Number of people over 
65 years old over the 
total population  
NUTS2 EUROSTAT 
Share of 
population over 
75 
2019 
Number of people over 
75 years old over the 
total population  
NUTS2 EUROSTAT 
Education 
Share of adults 
with higher 
education  
2017 
Adult population (aged 
25 to 64 years old) with 
tertiary education (5-8 
ISCED level)  
NUTS2 EUROSTAT 
Health system 
Doctors per 
capita 2017 
Number of doctors 
over population  NUTS2 EUROSTAT 
Hospital beds 
per capita 
2017 Number of hospital 
beds over population  
NUTS2 EUROSTAT 
Air pollution 
Air pollution  2016 
Exposure to air 
pollution by particulate 
matter (PM 2.5)  
NUTS 0 OECD 
Total household 
carbon footprint 2010 
Total household carbon 
footprint (kgCO2e/cap) NUTS2 
Ivanova et al. 
(2017) 
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Average 
household 
carbon footprint 
2010 
Total household carbon 
footprint (kgCO2e/cap) 
per family 
NUTS2 Ivanova et al. 
(2017) 
Climate 
Average 
temperature 2019 
Average temperature in 
C° NUTS2 Agri-4-Cast EU-JRC 
Average 
precipitation 
2019 Average precipitation 
(mm)  
NUTS2 Agri-4-Cast EU-JRC 
Autonomy 
Regional 
autonomy 2016 
Regional Authority 
Index (RAI) NUTS2 
Hooghe et al. 
(2016) 
Government 
Quality 
Regional 
government 
quality 
2017 
European Quality of 
Government Index 
(EQI) 
NUTS2 
Charron et al. 
(2016) 
University of 
Gothemburg 
Change in 
regional 
government 
quality 
2017-
2010 
European Quality of 
Government Index 
(EQI) 
NUTS2 
Charron et al. 
(2016) 
University of 
Gothenburg 
National 
government 
effectiveness 
2018 
Worldwide Governance 
Indicators NUTS0 
Kaufmann and 
Kraay (2020) 
World Bank 
Change in 
national 
government 
effectiveness 
2018-
1998 
Worldwide Governance 
Indicators NUTS0 
Kaufmann and 
Kraay (2020) 
World Bank 
Social capital & 
trust 
Frequency of 
meeting friends 
(once a week or 
more) 
2016 
Share of the population 
meeting friends & 
family socially at least 
once a week 
NUTS2 
European Social 
Survey 
Generalised 
trust 2016 Level of trust in others NUTS2 
European Social 
Survey 
Bridging 
networks 
2016 
Participation in 
voluntary association 
that encourage 
relationships between 
dissimilar or unfamiliar 
people 
NUTS2 European Social 
Survey 
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Table B2. Summary statistics 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
N Mean St. Dev. Min. Max 
      
Excess mortality (%) 206 4.354 10.35 -7.712 60.86 
Excess mortality (x 100,00 inhab) 206 19.16 49.91 -77.95 247.0 
Median population age 2019 211 43.27 3.790 17.70 51 
Share of adults with higher education 2017 209 38.86 10.82 18.90 74 
Regional government quality 2017 190 0.125 0.963 -2.264 2.323 
Change in regional government quality 2010-2017 190 0.00241 0.403 -1.127 1.203 
Regional autonomy 2016 200 14.71 7.569 1 27 
Average temperature 2019 202 11.38 3.242 0.538 20.01 
Average precipitation 2019 202 2.010 0.777 0.223 4.933 
Generalised trust 2016 171 -0.0352 0.381 -1.507 0.635 
Bridging networks 2016 171 0.0230 0.369 -0.885 1.843 
National government effectiveness 2018 211 1.199 0.544 0.112 2.040 
Change in national government effectiveness 1998-2018 211 -0.173 0.352 -0.670 1 
Share of population over 65 2019 210 0.238 0.042 0.031 0.343 
Share of population over 75 2019 210 0.131 0.030 0.014 0.216 
Population 2019 211 14.24 0.961 10.30 16.70 
Population density 2018 211 4.935 1.277 1.224 8.919 
Air passengers 2018 211 5.814 3.928 0 11.56 
GDP 2018 197 10.57 1.182 7.219 13.51 
GDP per capita 2018 197 10.11 0.586 8.294 11.50 
Accessibility by road 2014 202 14.50 0.905 11.53 15.97 
Total household carbon footprint 2010 (ln) 173 23.79 1.123 19.91 26.21 
Average household carbon footprint 2010 (ln) 173 9.249 0.267 8.605 9.993 
Doctors per capita 2017 178 -5.627 0.309 -7.211 -4.846 
Hospital beds per capita 2017 184 -5.360 0.449 -6.613 -4.353 
Air pollution 2016 195 2.400 0.431 0.788 3.411 
Frequency of meeting friends 2016 168 63.35 14.21 16 91.54 
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